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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PERCY MOUNTEER, 
Appellant and 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No, 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is slander (committed by one employee acting within the 
scope of her employment, against a co-employee) a compensable 
industrial accident, for which civil relief is barred under the 
exclusivity provisions of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1988)? 
REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY 
COURT OF APPEALS 
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari from an 
opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah as 
Case No. 880189-CA and reported as Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71 (Court of Appeals 5/2/89). 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed May 2, 
1989, and this Petition is, therefore, timely under Rule 45 of 
the Rules of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-3(i) and §78-2(a)-3 (1987) as an appeal in a civil 
matter from a final ruling or judgment in a district court in 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction. 
(All Utah Code references are to Utah Code Ann. 1953.) The 
appeal was originally filed before the Supreme Court as Supreme 
Court Case No. 87-0374 on January 19, 1988. Thereafter, this 
appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals. 
This Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme 
Court of Utah is sought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 43(4) as 
an issue of state law not previously decided by the Supreme 
Court; Rule 43(2), as a decision by a panel of the Court of 
Appeals which is in conflict with the Supreme Court on a matter 
of state law; and Rule 43(3), as a decision that has 
substantially departed from existing case authority on the 
important issue of what constitutes an "accident" in the field of 
worker's compensation law. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The only provision of Utah law which may be controlling 
is Utah Code Ann. 1953, §35-1-60 (1988), dealing with the 
exclusivity of the worker's compensation remedy. This section is 
cited in the argument below and attached as Appendix E. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff below, Percy Mounteer ("Mounteer") sued 
Utah Power & Light for damages resulting from a slander and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress committed by another 
Utah Power & Light employee, acting within the scope of her 
actual authority. The trial court dismissed the Complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. The Complaint is attached hereto as Appendix A 
and the court's Minute Entry and Order of Dismissal are attached 
as Appendices B and C, respectively. 
The case was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court 
(Supreme Court No. 87-0374) and subsequently transferred to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(i) and 
§78-2(a)-3 (1987). In a Memorandum Decision filed as Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 107 U.A.R. 71 (Ct. App. May 2, 1989), the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. This petition for 
certiorari was thereafter timely filed. 
In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, 
this court construes the Complaint in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and indulges all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff's favor. Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 
P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). Since this was done by the Court of 
Appeals and many issues were decided favorable to the Appellant, 
only those facts necessary to understand the background of 
the case are discussed. 
Mounteer was an employee of Utah Power & Light Company 
who was on duty the night of the Wilberg Mine disaster, and 
developed an emotional and nervous condition as a result thereof. 
(Record, page 3; hereinafter "R. n ) . He was the employee 
who shut down the power to the mine because of a misunderstanding 
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(R.2). Niki Larsen ("Larsen") was a security guard assigned to 
investigate Mounteer for suspected drug use. R. 2, 4. In the 
course of her investigation, Larsen interviewed Mounteer and then 
called the mine superintendent over a loud speaker, accusing 
Mounteer of being on drugs. Many other employees heard the 
allegations, which were false. R. 2, 4. 
Mounteerfs Complaint against Utah Power & Light alleged 
slander and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Mounteer claimed that Utah Power & Light was 
vicariously liable for Larsen's actions because she acted within 
the scope of her actual or apparent authority. Appendix A. Most 
of the argument below in both the trial court and before the 
Court of Appeals dealt with the issue as to whether or not Larsen 
was operating within the scope of her authority. The court's 
Minute Entry did not even mention the worker's compensation 
exclusivity provision ("worker's compensation bar") as a reason 
for its decision. Appendix B. The Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal again focused totally on the issues of vicarious 
liability for defamatory statements and did not mention the 
worker's compensation bar. Mounteer's Brief on appeal made only 
passing mention of the issue (2 pages in a 20 page Brief), noting 
that he was only raising the issue because it had been raised by 
Utah Power & Light in its Motion to Dismiss below, although it 
was not a part of the court's decision and did not seem to be a 
basis of the appeal. Mounteer Brief, p. 17-18. Utah Power & 
Light's Brief on appeal did not even mention the worker's 
compensation issue. The issue was only mentioned in passing 
during oral argument before the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with Mounteer that Larsen 
was acting within the scope of her employment, implying that Utah 
Power & Light would, therefore, normally be liable for her 
defamatory statements. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co, supra 
at 72. However, the Court of Appeals surprisingly focused on the 
worker's compensation issue, finding that Mounteer's action was 
barred by the exclusivity provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 
(1988). The Court of Appeals thus sustained the dismissal on the 
sole ground that the slander against Mounteer constituted a 
compensable "accident" under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, 
which barred a civil suit. Mounteer, supra at 73. 
| ARGUMENT | 
SLANDER (AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS) SHOULD NOT BE DEEMED TO BE A COMPENSABLE 
"INJURY" WHICH "OCCURS BY ACCIDENT," UNDER WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION, THUS BARRING MAINTENANCE OF A CIVIL 
ACTION. SUCH A HOLDING IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
ESTABLISHED LAW AND IS BAD PUBLIC POLICY. 
The Court of Appeals essentially held that a slander 
committed by one employee against another, while in the scope of 
employment, is an "injury" resulting from an "accident" under the 
Worker's Compensation Act, thus barring a civil suit under 
§35-1-60. Mounteer, supra at 72-3. Mounteer maintains that 
holding is in conflit with the Supreme Court's decision in Allen 
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986); contrary to 
established precedent; and bad law and bad policy for the State 
of Utah. 
A. Slander Is Not an "Accident" or an "Injury." 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1988) provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries 
sustained by an employee, . . . shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer . . . 
and the liabilities of the employer imposed by 
this act shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise, to such employee . . . on account 
of any accident or injury . . . incurred by 
such employee in the course of or because of 
or arising out of his employment, and no 
action at law may be maintained against an 
employer . . . based upon any accidenty injury 
or death of an employee, (emphasis added) 
This statute is attached in its entirety as Appendix E. Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1987) defines a compensable "injury" as one 
that "occurs by accident" arising out of or in the course of 
employment. Thus, for the worker's compensation bar to come into 
play, the employee must have an "accident" which results in an 
"injury." This Court has defined "accident" for purposes of 
worker's compensation as ". . .an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of the 
injury." Allen, supra at 22. 
The Court of Appeals correctly characterizes Mounteer's 
claim for damages from the slander and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as follows: 
He requested reimbursement for medical 
expenses, and damages for permanent total 
disability, suffering, and damage to 
reputation. (emphasis added) 
Mounteer, supra at 72. The Court of Appeals1 opinion then tries 
to force the slander allegations into the mold of an "accident," 
while totally ignoring the actual allegations in the Complaint. 
The opinion notes: 
According to Mounteer's own allegations, 
he was indisputably injured by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. He was thus clearly barred 
by the statute from bringing a negligence 
action at law against either Larsen or 
Utah Power & Light. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 73. That characterization is erroneous. Mounteer1s Brief 
on Appeal strongly asserts that his injuries were not the result 
of an accident (see Point III of Appellant's Brief). Moreover, 
the Allen definition of accident requires an "unexpected or 
unintended occurrence" that causes the injury. Larsen's acts of 
slander, as alleged in the Complaint, can hardly be termed 
"unexpected" or "unintended." The trial court and the Court of 
Appeals were obligated to take the allegations of the Complaint 
at face value. Those allegations indicated that Larsen's actions 
were done "knowingly" (Paragraph 7) and that the actions were 
"intentional or at least grossly negligent" (Paragraph 17, R. 4). 
The Court of Appeals1 holding that the slander against 
Mounteer constituted an "accident" or "injury" is contorted and 
highly questionable, based upon the statutory definitions in the 
Allen case. It makes more sense to deem slander not to be an 
"accident," but to view it as "intentional" or "grossly 
negligent" conduct, which should fall outside the worker's 
compensation bar in §35-1-60. 
B. Contrary to Established Case Law. 
The Court of Appeals1 decision is contrary to most of 
the established, well-reasoned case law dealing with slander and 
other similar torts in an employment setting. The major case in 
the field is Braman v. Walthall, 225 S.W.2d 342 (Ark. 1949). 
That case held that the essence of the tort of defamation is 
damage to one's reputation, not injury to one's physical or 
psychological being as contemplated by the Worker's Compensation 
Act. Any physiological injury and physical effects as a result 
of the defamation are secondary to the damage to reputation; 
therefore, a defamation action is not barred by the exclusivity 
provision of the Act. Larson, Workman's Compensation Desk Ed., 
§§68.33 and 68.31. Professor Larson commented on the issue of 
slander as follows: 
Here, as in the case of false imprisonment, 
the only element that introduces any 
possibility of serious controversy is the 
inclusion of physical injury as an element of 
damages. The same comment seems called for: 
the real gist of slander is not personal 
injury. To block the main thrust of the 
action because of this peripheral item, when 
a compensation claim could not purport to 
give relief for the main wrong, would be 
incongruous, and since splitting the cause of 
action is frowned on by courts and certainly 
outside the obvious intent of the 
exclusiveness clause would not be justified 
merely to put the personal injury item into 
the compensation stream, the cause of action 
belongs where its real essence lies, in the 
field of tort. (emphasis added) 
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Id. at §68.33, pp. 13-26. Although Mounteer sustained 
significant personal injuries from the slander, the initial 
detriment was significant damage to his reputation and character. 
Several hundred people heard Niki Larsen falsely claim to the 
mine supervisor, over an open public-address system, that 
Mounteer was on drugs. Price, Utah, is a small town. Obviously, 
the reaction of the townspeople would be immediate and severe 
upon learning that the person who shut off the power in the 
Wilberg mine disaster (R. 2) was "on drugs." The real gist of 
slander generally is not personal injury, although it is 
certainly an issue in this case. This Court could order that the 
cause of action be split, and that the case go to trial against 
Utah Power & Light on the issue of damage to reputation without 
any consideration of the physical damages sustained by Mounteer 
(which would be reserved for worker's compensation). That, of 
course, would violate a long-standing policy of all courts 
against splitting a cause of action. 
Mounteer has no remedy under worker's compensation for 
damage to his reputation, although such was alleged in the 
Complaint. Appendix A, Page 6, Paragraph 2. If one looks at 
just the "damage to reputation" component of the slander 
Complaint, there is certainly no "accident" or "injury," and, 
therefore, the Industrial Commission would not countenance 
damages for that loss under the auspices of a standard worker's 
compensation claim. Therefore, if this Court were to uphold the 
Court of Appeals' decision in whole, it would have the effect of 
simply denying Percy Mounteer any compensation for the damage to 
his reputation, an item which is clearly non-compensable under 
the Worker's Compensation Act. Since there is no quid pro quo 
for such a denial, it would violate Mounteer's Fifth Amendment 
rights to due process of law. Wright v. Central Dupage Assn., 
367 N.E.2d 736 (111. 1976); Moushon v. National Garages, 137 
N.E.2d 842 at 845 (111. 1956). 
Other cases have held that civil actions for similar 
torts such as false imprisonment and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress are not barred by the Worker's Compensation 
Acts. See, Smith v. Rich's, Inc., 123 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. App. 1961) 
(false imprisonment); Skelton v. W. T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593 
(5th Cir. 1964) (false imprisonment); Cohen v. Lion Products Co., 
177 F.Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959) (dictum; intentional infliction 
of emotional distress); Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 
N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1955) (action for nervous breakdown as a result 
of job discrimination not barred by compensation exclusiveness). 
There are cases to the contrary in this field. Also, some cases 
have allowed the splitting of a cause of action. Stimson v. 
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 258 N.W.2d 227 (Mich 1977). 
This Court may want to adopt an intermediate position 
and reverse only in part. Mounteer could be allowed to go back 
to the trial court and maintain his cause of action for damage to 
his reputation (and perhaps other non-phsycial damages for pain 
and suffering as well). Under such a proposal, the physical and 
psychological aspects of the claim could be handled under 
worker's compensation. 
C. Bad Public Policy, 
Upholding this Court of Appeals decision would be bad 
public policy because it would bring the tort of slander into the 
industrial compensation system, when that system is not capable 
of dealing with the issues of slander in the work place could 
lead to illogical and incongruous results in future cases. For 
example, suppose that Mounteer in this case did not suffer any 
psychological or physical injury as a result of the slander. 
Under the Court of Appeals ruling, Mounteer would presumably have 
a cause of action against Utah Power & Light for damage to his 
character and reputation. Thus, two persons with an identical 
slander in the same work place may be treated differently simply 
because one person's reaction to the slander causes secondary 
psychological or physical effects. The person with the 
psychological injury will be barred from filing suit in district 
court and be forced into the workerfs compensation regime where 
he will be forced to prove that the slander was an "accident." 
The first employee will also forfeit (without due process of law) 
any cause of action he has for the damage-to-reputation component 
of his claim. The other employee, perhaps employed by the same 
business, would be free to sue in court because his only damage 
is to his reputation. Such an incongruous result is not good 
public policy. 
Furthermore, does this state want to encourage 
incidents of slander in the work place to be filed as workerfs 
compensation claims? There must be numerous instances in the 
work-a-day world where statements are made by fellow employees or 
supervisors that are "slanderous." Yet, virtually no such cases 
make their way into the worker's compensation system, as viewed 
by the paucity of cases cited in Larson (see, Worker's 
Compensation, supra at §68.33). 
The Court of Appeals1 holding will encourage the filing 
of such actions as worker's compensation claims because of the 
"no-fault" basis of the act. Under the Court of Appeals' 
holding, presumably the employee would merely have to allege that 
a statement was made in the work place and that he suffered 
psychological harm from it. The employee would not have to prove 
the elements of slander, as he would in a court of law, anymore 
than he would have to prove the elements of negligence if he were 
injured by a falling ladder or a grease spot left on the floor. 
In short, the Court of Appeals decision significantly expands the 
worker's compensation liability of employers generally, not only 
to questionable slander claims but also to claims for false 
imprisonment, discrimination, wrongful discharge and a host of 
other tort actions that might result in secondary psychological 
damage. This is highly questionable as a matter of state policy. 
Under the Court of Appeals' ruling, in conjunction with 
the definition of accident under Allen, an employee could even 
establish a worker's compensation claim if he were slandered on 
the job by a third party! Suppose that the employee was a clerk 
at a fast-food store and while on duty, an acquaintance comes in 
and makes false, severely defamatory remarks about her chastity 
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in front of other employees and customers• The employee suffers 
a reaction, becomes physically ill and sustains permanent 
incapacity as a result. Under the Court of Appeals ruling, the 
incident constitutes an "industrial accident." 
The incongruous, illogical holding of the Court of 
Appeals is further emphasized when we consider the nature of the 
slander in the Mounteer case. Although Mounteer was at work at 
the time, he was engaged in no work activity which engendered the 
slander itself. The slander could just have easily occurred 
outside of the time, place and location of his employment. 
Mounteer could have been confronted at a restaurant with the 
same allegations, which could have been overheard by various 
members of the community and passed on to others. There was 
nothing inherently work-related with respect to the content of 
the slanderous remarks. Therefore, there is nothing peculiar or 
special about what Mounteer was doing for the employer at the 
time that would or should make his case a compensable accident 
under workerfs compensation law. 
Cases such as Percy Mounteerfs are best left to the 
civil courts for several reasons. First, the courts are better 
able to deal with issues such as slander, which generally 
embraces a strong non-physical component of damage. The courts 
are better able to sort out fictitious or questionable claims 
from those that are real because the civil liability system is 
based upon concepts of fault and proximate cause. The barriers 
presented by such concepts naturally have the effect of 
preventing the filing, and weeding out, of questionable claims. 
In shortf good public policy would dictate that claims for 
slander, false imprisonment and the like should best be dealt 
with by the civil courts, absent some fact which makes them 
uniquely industrial in nature. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court of Appeals 
erred in its holding that the slander in this case constituted a 
compensable industrial injury or accident. This Court should 
grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, reverse the Court of 
Appeals and remand the case to the trial court on the merits, on 
the issues of slander and intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. In the alternative, the Court should remand 
for trial only that portion of the case which involves damages to 
reputation, embarrassment and suffering. This would allow the 
remainder of the claim for the psychological and physical 
injuries and permanent and partial impairment to be decided under 
the principles of worker's compensation. 
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UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Defendant . 
Civil Mo^Tf 7 - J 7 7 / 
(Judge / 
Plaintiff, for cause of action, complains and alleges 
against defendant as follows: 
THE PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Emery County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant is a public utility and a corporation 
licensed to do business in the State of Utah and does business in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Niki Larsen, at all times relevant hereto, was an 
employee of the defendant, employed in the Administrative Office 
of the defendant as Chief of Security. At all times relevant 
herein, Larsen was acting with actual or apparent authority of 
defendant UP&L. 
4. At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"), 
in its Mining Division. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. On or about October 6, 1986, plaintiff was working 
as a warehouseman at Des-Be-Dove Minef in Emery County. 
6. On October 6, 1986, the plaintiff was in a 
substantial, elevated state of stress, caused by the defendant, 
for the following reasons: 
(a) In December, 19 84, at the time of the 
well-known Wilburg Mine accident, plaintiff was a dispatcher at 
the Wilburg Mine. 
(b) Plaintiff was called by a belt boss in the 
"fifth right" area and told that there was a fire in the mine, 
and the plaintiff should shut off the power. 
(c) The plaintiff proceeded to shut down the 
power to the entire mine, having understood that as the directive 
of the belt boss. 
(d) As a result of the shutting off of power in 
the mine, those charged with the responsibility of fighting the 
fire were not able to get power to run the hoses and to pump the 
poisonous air out of the mine. 
(e) Plaintiff attempted to consult with various 
management personnel at UP&L about the problem because he felt a 
sense of guilt since he was the individual who had the power 
turned off to the mine. In addition, several months after the 
disaster, plaintiff was transferred to the guardhouse at the 
front gate of the mine. In this position, he was required to 
interface with widows and family members of the deceased miners. 
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(f) Because of the great strain caused by these 
activities, he sought advice and help from various personnel 
employed by a subsidiary of the defendant, Emery Mining Company. 
(g) On one occasion, he was told by Gene Shockey, 
President of Emery Mining Company, to tell the grieving families 
essentially to "get lost" because nothing was owed by the company 
to these people. 
(h) Plaintiff was forced to live with this 
pressure until it caused significant problems in his personal 
life. 
7. While the plaintiff was in this agitated state, 
defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, came to the Des-Be-Dove Mine on 
October 6, 1986, and, in violation of company policy, and on an 
open-page system that was connected to loudspeakers, knowingly 
communicated to many of defendant's other employees the 
allegation that defendant was on drugs. When advised by another 
of defendant's employees that it was being broadcast on the 
public-address system, Larsen persisted and continued to make 
allegations to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs. 
8. The allegations were totally false. 
9. Defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, had been 
instructed by her superiors in the defendant's organization to 
investigate the plaintiff for drug use. UP&L had specific 
procedures that were to be followed when someone was suspected of 
drug use. 
10. Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false 
allegations in that it caused him severe mental and emotional 
damage, to the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric 
hospital for treatment. 
11. Plaintiff has sustained, as a rsjsult of the 
actions of the defendant, a severe aggravation of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, such that he is permanently and totally disabled 
from employment. 
12. Plaintiff has incurred substantial medical costs 
and is expected to incur substantial medical expenses in the 
future. 
13. At the time of defendant's actions in this case, 
plaintiff was making approximately $32,000.00 per year. Since 
the defendant's actions, he has been incapable of working and is 
not expected to work in the future. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Slander -
14. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
15. The statement made by the defendant's agent was 
false and defamatory in that it alleged that plaintiff was on 
drugs when such was not the case. 
16. The publication of the defamatory statement by 
Larsen was not privileged and, in fact, was in violation of the 
company's procedures with respect to allegations of drug use in 
any event. 
17. The actions of the defendant, by and through its 
agent, were intentional or at least grossly negligent. 
18. Plaintiff sustained extensive damages to his 
psychological, mental and emotional wellbeingf including but not 
limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish and 
depression. In addition, the plaintiff has been permanently 
damaged in his occupation such that he is permanently and totally 
disabled. He has also sustained extensive medical costs and will 
have substantial future costs. 
19. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because 
of the intentional, malicious and outrageous nature of the 
conduct involved. 
SECOND CADSE OF ACTION 
- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress -
20. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
21. The actions of the defendant, by and through its 
agentf constituted extreme and outrageous conduct which 
intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to 
the plaintiff. 
22. Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in 
paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress -
23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
24. In the alternative, and in the event that the 
actions of the defendant herein were neither intentional nor 
reckless, then the defendants actions were negligent. 
25. Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, 
and caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. 
26. Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in 
paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant 
as follows: 
1. For judgment for slander, in the amount of 
$500,000, or such other sum as may be proved, for permanent total 
disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder. 
2. For $300,000, or such other sum as may be proved 
at trial, for general damages for embarrassment, suffering, 
damage to reputation, and other such damages as may be proved at 
trial. 
3. For medical expenses in such an amount as 
plaintiff has incurred, and for an amount that he will incur in 
the future. 
4. In the event that any defense is raised in bad 
faith and without merit, for an award of attorney's fees. 
5. For costs of court herein. 
6. For such other relief as the Court may deem just 
in the premises. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 1987. 
AoitXZ jtf. BYKES //• 
Attorney for Plaifotiff 
Plaintiff's Address; 
96 East 200 North 
Huntington, UT 84528 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
!«flL 
PERCY MOUNTEER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. C-87-3791 
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted without 
prejudice. The Court finds as grounds, among others, for the 
granting of summary judgment herein that Utah Power & Light is 
not vicariously liable for the acts of its employee herein; that 
said acts of said employee were in violation of policy of the 
employer; that Utah Power & Light is not liable for defamatory 
statements made by one of its employees against another, unless 
the employee was directed to make said statements, which she was 
not in this case; and that Utah law does not recognize a cause of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Defendant's attorneys will draft the Order. 
/ V M 
' ^ day of^Augjjsttf ISW/J Dated t h i s 
u ATTEST 
H- DIXON HINDLEY 
ts -CLERK 
MOUNTEER V. UP&L PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this /€> day of August, 1987: 
Robert B. Sykes 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 S. State, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert Gordon 
Paul H. Proctor 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340 
P.O. Box 899 
S a l t Lake City , Utah 84110 
AATTTl^L 
» n - i - u im \jL.cnr\o u r r i o t 
ROBERT GORDON, #1221 
PAUL H. PROCTOR, #2657 
Attorneys for 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
1407 West North Temple, Suite 340 
P. 0. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 535-4256 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PERCY MOUNTEER, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO., 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGiMENT 
> OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 87-3791 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
By Motion dated July 22, 1987, Utah Power & Light Company 
moved the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12, U.R.C.P., which Motion was supported by a Memoranda of 
Authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition. The Motion was orally 
argued before the Court on July 31, 1987, at which time it was. 
taken under advisement. On August 3, 1987, the plaintiff filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition and in addition, filed a 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint together with the 
proposed Amended Complaint. 
On August 17, 1987, having fully considered all pleadings 
filed by the parties and the oral argument, the Court issued its 
APPENDIX - J L 
Salt Lake County Utah 
SEP 2-2-1987 
H. Dixon Hindtey, C^rk^yOist. Court 
Br K rflpTO?rw^ 
f\ Deputy Clerk 
Minute Entryf a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto. 
NOW THEREFOREf in accordance with the Minute Entry, the 
Court enters the following findings and grounds for the judgment: 
1. Utah Power & Light Company is not vicariously liable 
for the acts alleged herein of its employee Nickie Larsen. 
2. The acts of Nickie Larsen in knowingly communicating on 
an open-page system connected to loudspeakers to many of Utah 
Power & Light Company's other employees the allegation that the 
plaintiff was on drugs was in violation of the policy of Nickie 
Larsen's employer, Utah Power & Light Company. 
3. Utah Power & Light Company is not liable for defamatory 
statements made by its employee against the plaintiff, a co-
employee, unless Utah Power & Light Company directed the employee 
to make the defamatory statements. 
4. Utah Power & Light Company did not direct its employee 
Nickie Larsen to make the defamatory statements. 
5. Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
this action should be and is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this 3-#2^day of September 1987. 
BY THE^CPURT: 
ird/ WMof f a t 
D i s t r i c t {lourt Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDL6Y 
CLERK 
Approved as to form: 
Robert B. Sy&feS, Esq. 
M. Gale Lenuntm, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10.0002.2 
-1-
CODE• Co 
Provo. Utah 
when injuries are suffered that have been 
caused by an unknown act of negligence by an 
expert, the law ought not to be construed to 
destroy a right of action before a person even 
becomes aware of the existence of that right. Id. 
at 147. 
In this case, unlike Foil, Floyd's deposition 
testimony establishes that Floyd was aware in 
September of 1982 that Dr. Lindem performed 
surgery in addition to the hiatal hernia surgery 
and that his symptoms were caused
 #by the 
additional surgery. In contrast to Fo/i, Floyd 
had made the connection between the surgery 
and his symptoms, according to his clear 
deposition testimony. Therefore, by September 
1982, at the latest, Floyd discovered or should 
have discovered the injury and that the addi-
tional surgical procedures caused his injury. 
Consequently, we find no error in the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for def-
endants. 
Floyd also asserts that the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment because a 
question of fact exists regarding whether the 
health care providers attempted to conceal 
facts from Floyd and prevent him from disc-
overing the injury and the alleged negligence 
which caused the injury. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4(l)(b) (1987) 
provides: 
In an action where it is alleged that 
a patient has been prevented from 
discovering misconduct on the part 
of the health care provider because 
the health care provider has affir-
matively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the 
claim shall be barred unless com-
menced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable dili-
gence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever 
occurs first. 
Floyd claims that a conflict exists between 
the above statute and Utah Code Ann. §78-
12-26(3) (1987), which provides for a three 
year statute of limitations in causes of action 
for fraud and mistake. Under general rules of 
statutory construction, where two statutes 
treat the same subject matter, and one statute 
is general while the other is specific, the spe-
cific provision controls. State v. Burnham, 87 
Utah 445, 49 P.2d 963, 965 (1935); see also 
State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 
1983); Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 
1209 (Utah 1980). In this case, section 78-12-
26(3) contains the general statute of limitations 
for fraud while section 78-14-4(l)(b) of the 
Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act specifically 
provides the statute of limitations for cases 
involving patients who have been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of 
the health care provider. In accordance with 
v. Rep. 71 _ 71 
general principles of statutory construction, 
the more specific statute, section 78-14-
4(l)(b), controls. 
Applying section 78-14-4(l)(b) to the 
facts in this case, we must again examine when 
Floyd discovered or should have discovered 
alleged misconduct on the part of the health 
care provider. As has previously been stated, 
Floyd's deposition indicates that he discovered 
or should have discovered the alleged misco-
nduct by September 1982, but his notice of 
intent to bring this action was not filed until 
November 1985. Therefore, we hold that his 
claim was barred by the one year statute of 
limitations set forth in section 78-14-
4(l)(b). Accordingly, we find no error in the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
defendants. 
Finally, Floyd asserts that the special statute 
of limitations contained in the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act violates the equal prot-
ection clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. However, Floyd failed to raise 
this issue in the trial court proceedings or 
preserve it on the record, and we decline to 
consider the issue for the first time on appeal. 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Percy Mounteer appeals from the final 
order and judgment dismissing his complaint 
for failure to state a cause of action against 
respondent Utah Power & Light Company 
("UP&L"). We affirm. 
According to the June 1987 complaint filed 
in this action, Mounteer worked as a wareh-
ouseman at UP&L's mine in Emery County, 
Utah. He was under elevated mental stress 
because of his involvement in the December 
1984 Wilburg mine disaster. Niki Larsen, a 
security guard for UP&L, was instructed by 
her superiors at UP&L to investigate Mounteer 
for suspected drug use. UP&L had specific 
procedures to be followed in such cases. On 
October 6, 1986, Larsen came to the mine, 
briefly interviewed Mounteer at work, and 
in violation of company policy, and 
on an open-page system that was 
connected to loudspeakers, knowi-
ngly communicated to many of 
defendant's other employees that 
[Mounteer] was on drugs. When 
advised by another of defendant's 
employees that it was being broad-
cast on the public-address system, 
Larsen persisted and continued to 
make allegations to the effect that 
plaintiff was on drugs. 
These false statements, which Mounteer 
claimed were either intentionally, recklessly, or 
negligently made by Larsen, resulted in severe 
mental and emotional damage that, in turn, 
resulted in Mounteer's hospitalization and the 
aggravation of his post-traumatic stress dis-
order, rendering him totally disabled from 
employment. 
Mounteer did not sue Larsen, and made no 
allegations of any negligent or intentional 
injurious acts by UP&L directly. Instead, he 
sought to hold UP&L vicariously liable in 
damages for the acts of its agent, Larsen, 
under three asserted causes of action. The first 
was for slander for the unprivileged publica-
tion of false and defamatory statements, 
which, "in fact, was in violation of the 
company's procedures with respect to allega-
tions of drug use ...." The second and third 
causes of action were for intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. He 
requested reimbursement for medical expenses, 
and damages for permanent total disability, 
suffering, and damage to reputation. 
In the absence of any allegations that UP&L 
intended or directed Larsen's injurious acts, 
which were allegedly in violation of UP&L's 
policy, the trial court concluded UP&L could 
not be liable. Mounteer's complaint was dis-
missed without prejudice.1 
T« ../^j&virins* o HJcmiccol fnr failure tn *tate a 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and 
indulge all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's 
favor. Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Natl 
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). Such a 
dismissal is appropriate only where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of the claims ass-
erted. Freegard v. First W. Natl Bank, 738 
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). 
Appellant avers that his is a textbook case 
in which the employer should be vicariously 
liable, under the principle of respondeat sup-
erior, for the negligent or intentional acts of 
an employee/agent that injure a third party 
while that employee is carrying out the empl-
oyer's business and acting within the scope of 
employment. See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1989); Whi-
tehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 101 
Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1989); see also Johnson v. 
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) (recognizing 
cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and enunciating standards 
for employer's vicarious liability to third party 
for punitive damages awarded against negli-
gent employee). 
We agree that, viewing Mounteer's allega-
tions in a favorable light, as we must, reaso-
nable minds could conclude as a factual 
matter that Larsen was acting within the scope 
of her employment under the criteria enunci-
ated in Birkner, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19-
20, when she made the allegedly defamatory 
statements. However, the appropriate legal 
analysis does not stop here. Mounteer ignores 
the additional key fact that he was Larsen's 
fellow employee when he was allegedly injured 
in the course of his employment by Larsen's 
performance of her assigned task and refuses 
to acknowledge that the workers' compensa-
tion statute has reshaped an employer's liab-
ility in such circumstances. See Masich v. 
United States Smelting, Refining & Mining 
Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 615-17, appeal 
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948); see 
generally 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compen-
sation Law §§4.10-4.50 (1985). 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1988) prov-
ides: 
The right to recover compensa-
tion pursuant to the provisions of 
this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in 
death or not, shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the employer and 
shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent, or emp-
loyee of the employer and the lia-
bilities of the employer imposed by 
this act shall be in place of any and 
all other civil liability whatsoever, 
«• /%/xmmnn l o w nr ntVlPrWlQe tO 
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person whomsoever, on account of 
any accident or injury or death, in 
any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated or incurred by such 
employee in the course of or 
because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law 
may be maintained against an 
employer or against any officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer 
based upon any accident, injury or 
death of an employee.... 
(Emphasis added.) If an employee suffers a 
compensable injury, defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-45 (1987) as one that occurs 
by accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment,2 this section bars the maint-
enance of an action at law against either a 
fellow employee who is merely negligent or the 
employer as a vicariously liable principal. 
Instead, workers' compensation provides the 
exclusive remedy to the injured employee. E.g., 
Morrill v. J & M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 
88 (Utah 1981); Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 
Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968); Masich, 191 
P.2dat616. 
On the other hand, an employee who, in the 
course and scope of his or her employment, 
intentionally acts to injure a co-worker is not 
protected by this exclusivity provision from a 
separate action at law for damages. Bryan v. 
Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). But, in 
such a case, the employer is liable only to the 
extent of workers' compensation benefits 
unless the injurious act was directed or inte-
nded by the employer. Id. at 895. Without 
such direct responsibility, the employer "could 
not be required to respond as the offending 
employee's superior." Stewart v. CMI Corp., 
740 P.2d 134Q, 1341 n.l (Utah 1987) (dictum). 
See A. Larson, 2A Workmen's Compensation 
Law §§68.21, 68.23 & n.37, 68.33 & n.49.f 
(1987). 
According to Mounteer's own allegations, 
he was indisputably injured by accident3 
arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment. He was thus clearly^ barred by the 
statute from bringing a negligence action at 
law against either Larsen or UP&L. His alle-
gations concerning Larsen's intentional 
conduct, however, were sufficient to state a 
direct tort claim against her that was not 
barred by the exclusivity provision in section 
35-1-60, but she was not made a defendant, 
and UP&L cannot be liable at law for 
Larsen's intentional acts merely by operation 
of vicarious liability.4 If Mounteer had alleged 
facts supporting an inference that UP&L dir-
ected or intended Larsen's injurious acts, he 
would have sufficiently stated a claim against 
UP&L directly, and the statute would likewise 
afford UP&L no shield from liability in 
damages. "A complaint, to survive a motion 
to dismiss, must do more than merely allege 
intentional injury as an exception to the 
general exclusiveness rule; it must allege facts 
that add up to a deliberate intent [by the 
employer] to bring about injury." 2A A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
§68.14 (1987). In the absence of any such 
factual allegations, however, the trial court 
correctly concluded as a matter of law that 
Mounteer failed to state a claim against 
UP&L. 
The order of the trial court dismissing 
Mounteer's complaint is, therefore, affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. Because this ruling resolved the legal merits of 
any cause Mounteer may frame against UP&L, the 
order dismissing his complaint without prejudice is 
final for purposes of appeal. See Bowles v. State ex 
re/. Utah Dep't of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 
1982). 
2. This phrase was recently changed to "by accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment." 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
3. Mounteer summariiy contends that his injuries 
are not compensable as resulting from an "accident" 
under section 35-1-45 (1987) because they did not 
arise from any "physical contact, strain, exertion or 
other physical cause" but from mental anguish and 
an exacerbated nervous condition resulting from 
Larsen's actions. However, as the Utah Supreme 
Court held in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 
15, 22 (Utah 1986), an "accident" for purposes of 
workers' compensation "is an unexpected or unint-
ended occurrence that may be either the cause or the 
result* of the injury." Whether Mounteer's injury 
arose from a physical or mental cause is, therefore, 
irrelevant to the issue of whether it occurred "by 
accident" within the meaning of the statute. 
4. Commenting on Thompson v. Maimonides 
Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308 
(1982), in which an employee's causes of action 
imputing liability to the employer for a co-
employee's defamation, negligence, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress were dismissed for 
this same reason, Professor Larson notes: "This is 
true even if some of the harms resulting are of a 
kind for which compensation affords no remedy, 
such as loss of reputation, humiliation and embar-
rassment. The psychological injuries such as depre-
ssion or psychotic reactions would, of course, still 
be compensable under the compensation act." 2A A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §68.23 
n.37 (1987). 
35-1-60 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Notice and opportunity to be heard. commission, whose award has been annulled, 
This section inferentially at least provides cannot amend its findings of facts without giv-
that the commission shall give notice and an ing employer notice and an opportunity to be 
opportunity to be heard to all persons whose heard. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial 
rights may be affected by its award. Therefore, Comm'n, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 638. ** 1765. 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the indus-
trial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. § 35-2-1 et seq. 
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1. Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Cross-References. — Employment of chil- der the same catchline following § 35-1-46. 
dren, § 34-23-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Compulsory. 
Effect of no-fault insurance. 
Employer. 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
—Minor engaged in hazardous employment. 
Farmers and domestics. 
Hospital charges. 
Indemnification agreement between employer and third party. 
Indemnity agreement. 
Intentional tort. 
Joint venture. 
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Liability to third parties. 
Nature and adequacy of act. 
Negligent injury by employee of same employer. 
Occupational disease. 
Statutory employer. 
—"Sufficient control." 
Subcontractor's employee. 
Tort liability of employer. 
—"Dual capacity" doctrine. 
Cited. 
Compulsory. 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act is com-
pulsory and not elective. Lovato v. Beatrice 
Foods, 22 Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969). 
Effect of no-fault insurance. 
The No-Fault Insurance Act, former 
§ 31-41-1 et seq., did not supersede or nullify 
the Workmen's Compensation Act's exclusive 
remedy provision as applied to injuries from 
motor vehicle accidents suffered in the course 
of employment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 
538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975). 
Employer. 
Worker was employee of cable television 
company, its subsidiary, and its limited part-
ner for purposes of the exclusive remedy provi-
sions of the Utah Workmen's Compensation 
Act where the cable television company, as 
part of its management style, grouped all em-
ployees together under its direct control and 
where the worker's time sheets and checks 
were managed by the cable television com-
pany. Freund v. (Jtah Power & Light, 625 F. 
Supp. 272 (D. Utah 1985). 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
Under this section when the injury is caused 
by the negligent act of the employer, no willful 
misconduct being claimed, the injured em-
ployee or, when the injury causes death, his 
dependents, must be content to accept the com-
pensation provided by the act. Hailing v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 
(1927). 
Since the enactment of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy of 
an employee who is injured in the course of his 
employment is the right to recover the compen-
sation provided for in the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.). 
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 
274 P. 940 (1929); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet 
Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885 
(1945). 
Employee of railroad was not precluded from 
filing claim for compensation by application 
filed under Federal Employers' Liability Act 
on ground of election since employee did not 
have two remedies but only one; if injury was 
incurred while he was engaged in interstate 
commerce, his remedy was under Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act and if not, it was under 
state act. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 84 Utah 364, 35 P.2d 842, 94 A.L.R. 
1423 (1934). 
This section abrogates employee's common-
law right to sue employer for injuries suffered 
while in course of employment, except where 
employer is not subject to this act or common-
law remedy of employee is expressly reserved. 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Min-
ing Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal 
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L. 
Ed. 411 (1948). 
This section makes it clear that this chapter 
is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of compen-
sation for injury or death, against the employer 
and other employees to the exclusion of any 
and all other civil liability whatsover, at com-
mon law or otherwise, and that it bars all next 
of kin or dependents, or anyone else, from 
using any other means of recovery against em-
ployers and others named in and covered by 
the Act, than the Act itself. Morrill v. J & M 
Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981). 
— Minor engaged in hazardous employ-
ment. 
Even if a minor employee is injured while 
engaged in hazardous employment in violation 
of § 34-23-2, prohibiting the employment of 
minors in hazardous occupations, the minor's 
exclusive remedy is through this chapter, and 
the minor cannot void her employment con-
tract and sue in tort. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 
707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985). 
Farmers and domestics. 
Farm laborers and domestic servants, in the 
event of an accident or injury, are entitled to 
pursue their common-law remedies in an ac-
tion against the employer because they are ex-
cepted from the act by §§ 35-1-42 and 35-1-43. 
Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 
(1930). 
Hospital charges. 
The only power given the Industrial Com-
mission by the workers' compensation statutes 
over hospital charges for services rendered to 
injured employees is the right to refuse to pay 
that part of them which is excessive in amount 
or for care which was not reasonably neces-
sary; Industrial Commission does not have the 
power and authority to set maximum rates 
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which hospitals may charge for services ren-
dered injured employees, and hospitals are not 
prohibited from holding an injured employee 
liable for any amounts not paid by the commis-
sion. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982). 
Indemnification agreement between em-
ployer and third party. 
Where employer and third party voluntarily 
enter into a written indemnification agree-
ment whereby the employer agrees to indem-
nify the third party against claims arising out 
of injuries to the employer's employees, and 
where an employee is injured and is compen-
sated by the employer in accordance with the 
workers' compensation law, the exclusive rem-
edy provision of this section does not preclude 
the enforcement of the indemnification agree-
ment by the third party against the employer 
for amounts paid by the third party to the em-
ployee as a result of the injury. Shell Oil Co. v. 
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 R2d 1187 
(Utah 1983). 
Indemnity agreement 
An indemnity agreement is a separate un-
dertaking by the employer that will be enforce-
able despite workers' compensation if the in-
demnity provision expressly covers the indem-
nitor's employees, but the phrase "person or 
persons" does not cover indemnitor's own em-
ployees given the dramatic consequences of 
such an interpretation. Wollam v. Kennecott 
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987). 
Intentional tort. 
Provision prohibiting action for damages 
against fellow employee does not prohibit 
maintenance of action for premeditated and in-
tentional act of fellow employee. Bryan v. Utah 
Infl, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). 
Joint venture. 
Construction company obtained contract to 
construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered 
into agreement with corporation by which the 
two organizations would unite their efforts to 
complete such construction and share in profits 
or losses from the enterprise. Miner, hired by 
the construction company, who was injured 
while working on the tunnel and who obtained 
workmen's compensation benefits, could not 
sue corporation for alleged negligence of corpo-
rate employees since the two companies were 
regarded as the employing unit. The employees 
of both companies were engaged in the same 
employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 
Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963). 
This section barred suit by workmen against 
joint venturer which was his employer for inju-
ries sustained in use of machine furnished by a 
second joint venturer, where machine was fur-
nished pursuant to contract creating the joint 
venture. Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29 
Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104 (1973). 
Liability to third parties. 
Where plaintiff employee was injured when 
a fellow employee drove the truck in which 
they were riding into the side of a train, and 
brought an action against the railroad and the 
manufacturer of the crossing signal, alleging 
negligent upkeep and product defect, respec-
tively, neither defendant could join plaintiff's 
employer as a third-party defendant in order to 
assert a claim for contribution from it under 
the joint tort-feasor statute. Curtis v. Harmon 
Elec, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980) 
(decided under prior law). 
Nature and adequacy of act 
The workers' compensation scheme is purely 
statutory, and the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.) pro-
vides a plain, speedy, and adequate method of 
review. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 
Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929). 
Negligent injury by employee of same em-
ployer. 
Where subcontractor was an "employee" of 
contractor, other employee of contractor could 
not maintain negligence action against subcon-
tractor but must look to workers' compensation 
insurance. Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 
139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968). 
Occupational disease. 
Administratrix of deceased city employee, 
who died from inhalation of paint he was or-
dered to spray on trucks, could bring an action 
at law against the employer, since such was 
not an accidental injury compensable under 
this act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.), but was an "occupa-
tional disease." Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 
Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (1939). 
Statutory employer. 
—"Sufficient control." 
Where joint owners of interests in oil and gas 
leases provided for construction of a gas pro-
cessing plant located in Utah, to be operated as 
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose 
of extracting liquid hydrocarbons, and under 
the operating agreement the owners reserved 
the power of ultimate control over the project 
and over the operator thereof, the owners re-
tained "sufficient control" to qualify as statu-
tory employers of an employee of the operator 
pursuant to § 35-1-42(2) and the exclusive 
remedy provision of this section applied. Lamb 
v. W-Energy, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 
1987). 
Subcontractor's employee. 
Subcontractor's employee could not recover 
from general contractor in civil action for inju-
ries on theory that subcontractor was his em-
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ployer and general contractor was a third per-
son not in the same employment. Smith v. Al-
fred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 
(1972). 
This section does not forbid or render invalid 
a clause in a construction subcontract by which 
the subcontractor agreed to indemnify the 
prime contractor and save him harmless for all 
liability arising out of the injury or death of an 
employee of subcontractor, where such clause 
existed and decedent workman's administra-
trix sued prime contractor for wrongful death 
of decedent and recovered; therefore, dece-
dent's employer is required to reimburse prime 
contractor covered by workmen's compensation 
as provided in such indemnity clause. Titan 
Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 
1966). 
Tort liability of employer. 
— "Dual capacity" doctrine. 
Utah law does not recognize as an exception 
to the exclusive remedy provisions of the 
Worker's Compensation Act, the so-called 
"dual capacity" doctrine under which an em-
ployer, shielded from tort liability by the act, 
may become liable in tort if he occupies, in ad-
dition to his capacity as employer, a second ca-
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Al-
lows Contribution Against Co-tortfeasor De-
spite Immunity from District Suit: Bishop v. 
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 429. 
C.J.S 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 918. 
A.L.R. — Insured's receipt of or right to 
workmen's compensation benefits as affecting 
recovery under accident, hospital, or medical 
expense policy, 40 A.L.R.3d 1012. 
Workers' compensation law as precluding 
35-1-61. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 35-1-61 (C. 1943, Supp., 
42-1-57-10, enacted by L. 1945, ch. 65, § 2), 
relating to injuries to or death of illegally em-
pacity that confers on him an obligation inde-
pendent of those imposed on him as an em-
ployer. Worthen v. Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 
856 (10th Cir. 1985). 
An employee cannot hold his employer liable 
in tort for injuries resulting from the em-
ployer's maintenance of unsafe premises, on 
the reasoning that the employer occupies a sep-
arate capacity and owes separate duties to his 
employees as an owner of the premises, since 
the employer's duty to maintain a safe work-
place is inseparable from the employer's gen-
eral duties as an employer toward his em-
ployees. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 
678 (Utah 1985). 
The dual capacity doctrine did not apply to a 
products liability claim brought on behalf of a 
decedent who was killed when he was pulled 
into a large screw-auger manufactured by de-
fendant while decedent was working on his em-
ployer's premises, where the employer had not 
assumed a separate and distinct obligation to-
ward his employee other than as employer. 
Stewart v. CMI Corp., 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 
1987). 
Cited in Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 
F 2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1987). 
employee's suit against employer for third per-
son's criminal attack, 49 A.L.R.4th 926. 
Workers' compensation act as precluding 
tort action for injury to or death of employee's 
unborn child, 55 A.L.R.4th 792. 
Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coem-
ployee as ground of liability despite bar of 
workers' compensation law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
«=> 2084. 
ployed minor, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 
76, § 11. 
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